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Abstract
The aim of this research is to model altruistic blood and organ
donors behaviour. First, we make an analysis of the decision of to be
or not to be a donor for any individual. We propose a model where in-
dividuals compare the expected utility of deciding to become a donor,
with the utility of the alternative decision (not to become a donor).
Second, we continue with the identification of the variables having
influence over this decision, the expected effects of such a donation
(positive and negative) and the importance of the expectations over
individuals well-being and the subsequent decision.
We work with rational individuals that behave altruistically when mak-
ing a decision. The model is specific because the goods we consider
can only cover vital needs. We posed hypothesis about some variables
for each kind of the donations considered (blood and organ donations).
This hypothesis can be useful to identify which are the variables hav-
ing influence actually over this decision. We propose a pilot survey to
test our model. First results from a university students survey show
the relevant variables influencing blood an organ donations, and seem
to confirm the model.
Key words: altruism, interdependent utility functions, at-
titudes, blood/organ donations and behaviour
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1 Introduction
In this research we study what are the variables affecting positively to an
increase in the willingness to become a donor. This is the target of this
research: to analyze altruism in the health sector, in the field of blood and
organ donations. It is said that the impact of altruism in health economics
has not been deeply explored (Hanson R., 2007). In fact, it is not only
necessary but also very promising for mainstream economics to take the
presence of other-regarding preferences into account. People often do care
for the well-being of others and this has important consequences.
Under which conditions and why do some individuals decide to be donors?
The reasons driving an individual to do it are not unique. We can not
generalize a donor’s behavior, but we can say which are the variables hav-
ing a strong influence over these kind of decisions such as becoming donor.
Certain researchers make reference to sense of duty, responsibility, love and
other psychological rewards (Thorne, 2006).
Trust in physicians and in the process or system, solidarity, tradition, reci-
procity, trust and the benefit perceived by the donors when they give blood
or an organ with a transplant purpose, seem to be important factors hav-
ing influence on such a decision. There is an important lack of organs and
the number of blood donors does not rise nowadays. Certain investigators
argue that incentives might be useful to increase the supply of organs or
blood. The discussions here are about morality of the incentives proposed.
We focus the research onto detect the variables that are deciding on such a
behaviour. A second task, for future research, would be to think about how
to increase the number of donors. This research attempts to approach us to
the behavioural model of donors trying to explain why individuals decide to
become blood and organ donors, in a very preliminary way.
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2 Interdependent Utility Functions
In economics, there are assumptions about how consumers behave when
they have to make choices. Individuals, when they make choices, they are
defined as rational, capable of making decisions and self-interested.
It is typical to refer to Utility functions as a way of representing individ-
uals preferences. Suppose that these preferences  are asymmetric, nega-
tively transitive and continuous (then  admits a numerical representation).
Given preferences  on a set (finite) of goods X, a numerical representation
for those preferences is a function U with a domain X and range the real
line, such that x  y if and only if U(x) ≥ U(y) , being x and y two bundles
of goods contained in X.
The function U : X 7→ R measures all the objects of choice in a numeri-
cal scale, and a higher measure on the scale means the consumer likes the
object more (the functions are considered non decreasing). A function is
non decreasing then, if for any two bundles x and y such that x has higher
quantities than y of at least one of its goods, U ( x ) ≥ U (y). And it is
strictly increasing if U ( x ) >U (y) .
Property: Monotonicity on preferences 
If preferences are represented by U , these preferences are monotonic if and
only if U is non-decreasing, and these preferences are strictly monotonic if
and only if U is strictly increasing.
Evidence shows that individuals sometimes are other-regarding, and not just
self-interested, but show to be concerned about the other’s welfare taking
their preferences into account. Instead of searching to maximize his own
utility, an individual is going to sacrifice part of the utility he would have
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obtained behaving selfishly, because he is worried about the others’ welfare.
We say then that individuals have other-regarding or altruistic preferences.
Some prestigious economists talked about this kind of behaviour in different
contexts.
Our interest is altruism. In general, altruism is defined as the preference
for the others’ welfare. An altruist is an individual that makes a personal
sacrifice to increase the well being of another person (or group of people).
A formal definition for altruism is unselfish concern for the welfare of others.
There is not a unique definition for the concept altruism. In fact, there
are many, such as kin altruism (also named kin-directed altruism) reflected
in acts among familiars and associated to genes and biology, parochial al-
truism (a group of individuals where everyone is disposed to help the rest of
individuals of the group, but not to those out of the group), unconditional
altruism (this kind of altruism is represented by an individual who is dis-
posed to help everybody without restrictions) and reciprocal altruism (there
is an expectation of being compensated because of the action) between oth-
ers.
So, we can talk about an altruist as somebody who gets rid of a certain
quantity of a good(s) with the purpose of increasing the utility of another
person (or group of people).
The utility function representing altruistic preferences has a characteristic
that differs from the self-interested utility functions. Preferences also state
the necessary conditions to be represented, even though they are specific in
one aspect: they are not monotonic. The function U in these cases does not
state the non-decreasing condition. This is the major difference between
self-interested utility and other-regarding utility functions.
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Imagine that we have an individual i that makes a donation, such that
he faces two bundles: x0d={x1, x2} and x1d={x1, x∗2}. The upper index rep-
resents the moment of time, so that x0d represents the bundle of goods before
making the donation, and x1d is the bundle of goods after donation. In a
situation where a donation is made, (suppose that the individual gives some
quantity of his initial endowment of good x2. Then, after donation the new
quantity of the good is not x2 but x∗2, and states x∗2 < x2). A non decreas-
ing function would state that x0d  x1d because Ui(x0d) > Ui(x1d). However,
assuming altruism on preferences, even if the initial endowment was higher
before donation, the final result (in terms of utility) for the individual, is an
increase in well-being after donation actually (Ui(x1d) ≥ Ui(x0d)). That proofs
that preferences, if individuals are altruistic, do not satisfy monotonicity.
In the early 80’s unselfishness behaviour was well established in the pro-
fession: it relies on two forms of utility interdependence. Altruism meant
either the inclusion of anothers’ satisfaction in an individual’s utility func-
tion or, less frequently, the inclusion of the value of resources given away.
Individuals sometimes, giving some quantity of one good, can be better than
initially. The reason is that the loose in individual’s utility because of the
reduction of a certain quantity of a good, gets compensated by the increase
in utility because of the satisfaction, either for the fact of giving or for the
improvement of the recipient’s utility (or for both reasons simultaneously).
In this work, we propose utility interdependence. We consider an altru-
ist as someone who includes anothers’ utility in his own utility function.
From now to the end we will treat i as an individual who cares for the oth-
ers’ welfare (an altruist) and −i is the (finite) set of recipients (an individual
or a society) and we do not care if they are altruistic or not. Our research
is focused on the donor’s behaviour.
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The interdependent utility function that we propose, written in its gen-
eral form is Ui=Ui(Xi, U−i(g)).
Then, for this function:
1. Xi={x1,i, x2,i, ..., xn,i} is the set of goods for the individual i
2. Ui is the utility function representing the preferences of the i individ-
ual, depending on a set Xi .
3. g represents the good that i has and that would increase the utility of
the −i individuals.
4. U−i is the utility function for the −i individuals considered. It could
be one person (in a two player’s context, for example), a society, or a
group of people.
5. U−i depends on a set of goods X−i = {x1,−i, x2,−i, ..., xm,−i} (that
means that −i has his own preferences) but we consider that this is
not relevant for the i individual. When i includes the utility of the
−i individuals, he is only considering the utility that these individuals
would obtain when they receive g (the donation from i). So we consider
just that U−i depends on g. Then, the other-regarding part of the
utility function for the individual i would state that U−i(g) =
∂U−i
∂g , as
other utility is not relevant for the i individual (the donor compares
the utility of the recipient with the one that the recipient would have
in a situation where g =0; that is, when no donation is made).
The number of alternatives n, in Xi, is not necessary equal for all the indi-
viduals. Each individual faces a different set of goods, and also individuals
might order alternatives differently. Individuals are heterogeneous.
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Giving g has two effects:
1. The gift g, from i through the other individual/s −i, implies a reduc-
tion of the utility of i as a result of getting rid of one of the goods (xi)
which provided him of utility.
2. Second effect is an increase of the utility due to the satisfaction ob-
tained, either because the other individual (the recipient) has more of
one of the goods relevant for him, or for the only fact of giving.
We are interested in blood an organ donations, so the gift considered is going
to be either blood or an organ donation. Donations we consider are special
for many reasons:
• First, the gift in the situations we consider, decides if the recipient
continue alive or die. It is not a monetary transfer that implies an
increase on the recipient’s revenue. An individual in need of a trans-
plant or transfusion, if there is no gift, dies. The goods we consider to
be transferred are goods that serve to cover a vital necessity.
• Second, the gift is made with an specific purpose, which is to save
some others’ living.
• Third, with monetary transfers sometimes the recipient has to choose
how to spend the money received. Here the recipient has no choice.
He needs the gift for continue living, and there is not another possible
use of the gift that the lingering of life.
• Finally, sometimes more than one individual and organism are involved
in the decision making. For example, in the living organ donations,
the family of the donor inevitably has influence over the donor’s fi-
nal decision, but also physicians that are responsible of checking the
compatibility between donor and recipient and of the detection if the
donor is suitable for donation.
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So we have a utility function Ui such that, when the utility function of the
recipient (−i) increases receiving, from a donor (i), an extra quantity of
the good xi ∈ X−i and also the donor gains utility because the recipient
is better off after donation. As we are working with interdependent utility
functions individuals include the utility of the rest of −i individuals in their
own utility and this part of the utility considering the others welfare has a
direct effect over the donors utility.
We represent this effect, of the recipient’s utility variations over the donor’s
utility, with a function vi(Ui(g), g). This function depends directly on the
others’ utility gained after donation, vi(Ui(g)), and also on the only fact
of giving vi(g) (the benefit per se). Giving a good xi ∈ X−i increases the
utility of the recipient, but also increases the utility of the donor if he is able
to observe that the recipient is better of after the donation of a good xi in
a quantity g.
∀Ui,U−i ∃xi∈X−i3
∂U−i(X−i)
∂xi
> 0 and
∂vi(.)
∂U−i
· dU−i(.)
dxi
> 0 (1)
The utility function of an individual i is divided in two parts: the self −
interested part, and the other − regarding part. Each of these parts, is
going to have a different weight over the total utility of an individual, and
this weight is measured (in the model we are going to propose) with a pa-
rameter δi ∈ [0,1]. This parameter δi measures the importance (or weight)
that an individual gives to his self-interest utility with respect to the impor-
tance given to the interest of the utility of the rest of individuals considered
(measured by (1 − δi)). The condition we impose to these weights is to be
complementary.
Now that we have defined all the parameters and functions we can pass
to write the model.
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3 The Model
Let us consider an individual i that has to make a decision. The choice is
between becoming donor or not. We are going to write the preferences for
the i individual, using a utility function that states the properties of inter-
dependent utility function that we did mention and that are necessary.
The utility function Ui : (Xi, Hi(g), g, U−i(g)) 7→ R is a function that repre-
sents the preferences of the i individual. These preferences depend on:
• a set of goods Xi (finite but different for every individual)
• the loss of health for the individual in case of donation (Hi(g))
• g, that represents the donation made from i (the donor) through −i
(the recipient)
• a function U−i that represents the utility for the rest of individuals
that excluding the i-one
The utility that the individual i obtains with the consumption of goods
included in Xi is represented by pii(Xi), that is a portion δi of the total
utility (for δi ∈ [0, 1]). This part of the utility (pii) is the one representing
the self-interested utility for the individual. That is, the individual private
set of goods that satisfy individual’s preferences. If there is a loss due to
donation (∂pi(Hi)∂g ≤ 0), this would reduce the utility of the individual i. The
self interest function is then pii(Xi +
∂pi(Hi)
∂g ).
The other regarding part of the utility is going to be measured by the
function vi(g, U−i(g)) . The function vi(.) represents the utility that the
individual obtains when the society receives donation, and g is the quantity
given (half a litre of blood, a kidney). This function has two arguments: g
and U−i(g).
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• The individual has a benefit per se vi(g), associated to the fact of
giving that is strictly positive, whatever it is the result of donation (It
does not matter if the donation is useful or not).
• The individual obtains utility as a result of the increase in the utility of
the rest of individuals in the society. This is measured by vi(U−i(g)).
Each individual is not going to give the same importance to self-interest
and to the other regarding part of the utility. Individuals are heteroge-
neous, and then nobody has the same preferences because every individual
considers a different set of goods and has different interests. The weights
given to pii(Xi, Hi(g)) and vi(g, U−i(g)) are complementary, and these are
measured by a parameter that we are going to call δi. This parameter can
be understood as the degree of altruism. High values of the parameter δi
mean that self-interest matters more than the interest, of the society, for an
individual.
3.1 Decision context
An individual i is thinking about the possibility of becoming a donor (for
instance, we do not make distinction between blood and organ donations).
The individual is going to decide making a comparison between the expected
gains and the he expected losses (in case of deciding to become a donor).
The individual do not know certainly if the negative effect (associated to
the fact of deciding to become a donor) will be compensated by the positive
effect (measured by the function vi(.) as a measure of satisfaction) after de-
ciding to become a donor.
We work under the hypothesis that after a donation is made, the effects
of the donation over the recipient can be observed by the donor. However,
there is uncertainty on the effects of a donation, and this must be taken
into account. We introduce a probability p that measures the probability of
the total effect of deciding to become a donor (over an individuals utility)
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to be positive and (1−p) is the probability for this total effect to be negative.
In case of deciding to be a donor, and if physicians or any other decision
organism allow the individual to donate, the individual would donate a quan-
tity g of one of his goods to another individual −i. The individual knows
that there exists a positive effect of giving g (the satisfaction obtained be-
cause it is a contribution for the society) but also a negative effect. Donating
implies that the individual is obligated to get rid of a certain quantity (not
necessary the totality of the good, if it can be partitioned) of one of the
goods he obtains utility with his consumption. Then, after recruiting infor-
mation, the individual decides if becoming donor or not.
Then, the utility function that states for the context we describe is:
Ui(Xi, Hi, g, U−i) = δi · pii(Xi, Hi(g)) + (1− δi) · vi(g, U−i(g)) (2)
The function is a linear combination of self-interest and other-regarding pref-
erences. This is our benchmark. It is useful for showing that individuals are
concerned about the others welfare. Anyway, this function obviously could
be written in many different ways. For instance, we are supposing the rela-
tion to be linear, for simplicity (this does not mean that this is the only one).
The part of the utility called pii(Xi, Hi) represents what we call the self-
interested part that an individual considers, and depends on a set Xi, that
is a set of n goods and the utility for the individual is increasing with the
rise on consumption of the goods in this set and Hi(g) represents the loss of
health as a result of a donation for any individual. So pii(Xi +
∂pii(Hi))
∂g ) rep-
resents the benefit of the individual when making a blood/organ donation.
The utility of the individual, when donating, decreases in a portion δi ∈ [0,1]
. This means that there exists a marginal loss of giving ( ∂pii∂(Hi) ·
dHi
dg ≤ 0). Pri-
vate utility will be lesser after donation if the individual decides to be donor.
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The other-regarding part of the utility is represented by vi(g, U−i(g)), that
we have called the satisfaction function, and specifically the individual is
concerned about the utility that the society has as a result of the consump-
tion of a certain good (g). The marginal other-regarding utility for the
individual i is increasing on g. A positive gift from i through the society
increases the utility of the society, and then the utility of i increases too, in
a portion (1-δi). The same reasoning is made for the set of goods of the soci-
ety. If the initial endowment of resources of the −i individuals is represented
by X−i, the society, receiving a donation of quantity g improves in welfare
and so do the donor. In other words, the marginal utility when the soci-
ety receives g, is increasing for a positive quantity of g. Then, ∂vi∂U−i ·
dU−i
dg > 0.
The total expected effect of giving blood or an organ in life over the fi-
nal utility would be the difference between how much the individual expects
to loose and how much he expects to gain. This is going to depend also on
the values of the parameter δi. Calling to δi ·∂pii(Hi)∂g the negative effect, and
to (1-δi)·vi(g+∂U−i(g)∂g ), the positive effect. There are three possibilities after
the donation decides to become a donor:
1. The positive effect is higher than the negative effect. In such a case,
the total effect is an increase in the utility for the individual.
2. The positive effect is lower than the negative effect. As a result, the
individual is worst off after donation.
3. The positive effect is equal. As a result, the individual is indifferent
after donation.
We usually think that individuals give more importance to their self-interest
than to the others’ well-being. In this research we hypothesize that this is
not necessarily true. We consider that individuals can give to the others
welfare the same importance than they give to their own welfare, or even
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more; that is we introduce the possibility of altruistic individuals, and this
assumption means that our individuals are prepared to sacrifice part of their
utility to increase the welfare of other individuals and, even when this sac-
rifice supposes a cost for them, the result for the individual is that the
satisfaction that he obtains due to the improvement on utility of the rest of
individuals compensates the cost of giving (in terms of less utility).
Most of the decisions made by individuals are made under uncertainty. In
the case we study, individuals dont know with certainty the consequences
of becoming donor. The uncertainty of these consequences is represented
by a probability p that is the probability for the individual to be better off
after donation. As a probability, p ∈ [0,1]. Then, (1− p) is the probability
(complementary) of being worst of after donation. We are going to do the
assumption that this probability is unknown for individuals, but the more
an individual is informed, the less will be the uncertainty about the donation
consequences.
As rational individuals acting under uncertainty, they are going to calcu-
late the expected utility of becoming donors. Individuals play a lottery. An
individual who is not sure about to donate, before making a choice, he must
make expectations about how much he would gain and how much he would
loose. Then he compares and decides what to do. Probabilities will help
an individual to decide. The lottery that the individual plays is written as
follows:
Li =

δi ·
(
pii(Xi) +
∂pii(Hi)
∂g
)
≤ (1− δi) · vi
(
g + ∂U−i(.)∂g
)
with p
δi ·
(
pii(Xi) +
∂pii(Hi)
∂g
)
> (1− δi) · vi
(
g + ∂U−i(.)∂g
)
with (1-p)
(3)
With a probability p the individual is better off after donation because the
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utility he looses when he gives a quantity g with respect to the initial en-
dowment (called the negative effect) is lower than the utility that he gains
in compensation (the positive effect). In other words, p is the probability
for the total effect to be positive and (1− p), is the probability for the total
effect to be negative. In the later case it holds on the self-interested utility
(or even lower) because, in such a situation, no gift is made.
We can see how would be written the utility function depending on the
values of g:
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1. For all g ≥ 0 and under the hypothesis that i) there is a loss of utility
if there is a loss of health for the individiual as a result of donation
(∂pii(Hi)∂g ≤ 0) and ii) there is an other-regarding effect (that can be
positive or negative), then:
Ui =

p ·
[
δi · [pii(Xi) + ∂pii(Hi)∂g ] + (1− δi) · vi
(
g + ∂U−i(.)∂g
)]
∀Neg.Effect≤Pos.Effect
(1− p) ·
(
δi · pii(Xi)
)
∀Neg.Effect≥Pos.Effect
(4)
2. For all g = 0 ⇒ ∂pii(Hi)∂g = 0 & ∂Ui(.)∂g = 0, ⇒ Ui = δi · pii(Xi)
The expected utility will be written as follows:
E[Ui(.); p ∈ [0, 1]] = p·
[
δi·
(
pii(Xi)+
∂pii(Hi)
∂g
)
+(1−δi)·vi
(
g+
∂U−i(.)
∂g
)]
+(1−p)·[δi·pii(Xi)]
(5)
Simplifiying, we obtain the formal expression for the expected utility of
donation (for the i individual):
E[Ui(.); p ∈ [0, 1]] = δi ·pii(Xi) +p ·
[
δi · ∂pii(Hi)
∂g
+ (1− δi) ·vi
(
g+
∂U−i(.)
∂g
)]
(6)
The expected utility must be higher after donation than the utility of not
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to donate. Then, the individual will decide to become a donor.
If the individual expects to obtain a lower utility after donation, means
the satisfaction obtained by giving does not compensate the loose (the in-
dividual is not altruistic enough). Then, the individuals best choice is the
alternative solution: decide not to become a donor. It can be demonstrated
that the parameter δi must be δi ≥ −vi(.)∂pii(Xi)
∂g
−vi(.)
As ∂pii(Xi)∂g ≤ 0, and νi(.) ≥ 0, the parameter δi can not be higher than
1.
Each individual knows the value of δi, and also they have expectations about
how much they would loose or gain in terns of utility. Every individual de-
cides his after analyzing the situation and making a decision.
If an individual has a value of δi higher than 12 , it is necessary that the
marginal gain exceed the marginal loose of giving. Other wise, the total ef-
fect expected for the individual would be negative, and the individual finally
would decide not to become donor.
A self-interested individual (δi =1) would choose as his prescription g= 0.
An individual who is self-interested is only concerned about his own utility,
and his best answer is to keep everything for him, to maximize his utility.
The opposite case, is the individual for whom δi= 0. This individual would
choose as his prescription g=xi, because as an other-regarding individual,
his best answer is to decide to become a donor.
The final result if the individual decides to become donor, is that the indi-
vidual expects that he is going to be better off (or equal) after the donation
is made, while the recipient of donation (the society) would improve on
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utility too. Anyway, the theoretical concept of altruism keeps bounded in
practice. When the expected costs of a donation are too high, individuals
that in principle were disposed to donate can finally change their mind.
If an individual has to make a decision, like decide if becoming donor or
not, the probability of a positive decision (decide to become donor) is lower
when the difference between the expected loss and gains for the donor is
lower too (this happens for an individual who has very high values of δ and
similar values of ∂pii(Xi)∂g and vi(.), or very high values for the marginal loss,
so that the positive effect do not compensate the negative effect either way).
The individual maximizes his expected utility when the difference between
the expected utility of becoming donor and the utility of the alternative is
the highest. This situation happens when the marginal loose is close to zero
and, simultaneously, the marginal gain tends to infinite. When both are
similar, the value of the parameter δi makes an individual decide. It is not
how much an individual expects to gain or to loose, but how important an
individual considers the gains and looses.
The reason that makes us choose this expression for the expected utility
of a donation as a reference point, even if it is very general, is that we hy-
pothesize that the behaviour of blood and organ donors could be a specific
behaviour shown by this function.
• For Blood Donors, we can expect a very low probability of being worse
after donation than before it. Blood donations do not have, in general,
consequences over the donor in terms of a reduction of health or other
negative consequences. The probability of being worse after donation
may be negligible (very close to zero). Even though, the value of δi
keeps unknown and is going to differ for each donor. Our interest is
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to know the reasons for the high values of the coefficient (1− δi)
• For Organ Living Donors the probability of being worse off after do-
nation is expected to be very high. An individual giving a kidney is
going to need a treatment after donation, as a substitute of the vital
functions of the kidney. He changes a healthy status for becoming a
chronic patient (from the health care point of view) in need of system-
atic revisions. The reasons for donation for these kinds of individuals
are then reflected on high values of (1−δi) or higher perceived benefits
(due to satisfaction of giving an organ to somebody in need) than costs
of donating, that are also expected to be high for any individual.
We think that behind the behaviour of taking a decision to donate blood, or
to donate an organ, there is an altruistic motivation. In this research we are
going to consider blood donors and organ living donors, but, for instance,
we leave the case of deceased donors. From now on we consider the cases of
blood/plasma and organ/bone marrow donations.
The main idea here is try to find which are the factors having a stronger
influence when somebody makes the decision of becoming a donor. Specif-
ically, the study will be based in recent papers all of them analyzing the
impact of rational and psychological variables and their effects they have on
the increase of the willingness to become an organ donor and sign a donor
card.
With this information we can now start to analyze which is actually the
behaviour for each of the donors considered.
We make some hypothesis about individuals behaviour for individuals. These
assumptions we do are:
1. Each individual, before making the decision of donating or not, com-
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pares the expected benefits (measured by the utility function) with
the expected costs associated to the decision of donating.
2. Individuals are heterogeneous in preferences, having different likes and
dislikes, and also individuals facing similar situations react differently.
3. Individuals preferences are not stable, but changeable with the time.
This is important because if somebody, in some moment, decides to
become a donor, this does not give us the certainty that he is a per-
manent donor.
4. The donors we consider are blood/plasma donors, and organ/bone
marrow living donors.
We must distinguish two different steps in a decision-making: the first one
would take until the individual makes the decision of donating or not (that
could be explained by the model proposed), and the second one is from the
point he has made the decision to the moment when donation is done (or
not). An individual, when making a decision, has to face different factors
that have an influence over his decision. The individual before deciding re-
cruits information, ask to people close to him for advice, or thinks about
the possible effects his decision could have and value them.
4 Influencing variables over individuals’ behaviour
In this third section of the research we identify the variables that are impor-
tant for the decisions in the context we study (blood and organ donations).
Some of them stand out in the literature.
19
The method we use for the identification is a pilot questionnaire. Asking
individuals about their intentions and their opinions about different aspects,
regarding blood and organ donations, we expect to identify what individu-
als, actually, consider to be important for making the decision of becoming
donor or not.
Individuals, when they consider the possibility of becoming donor, compare
what they expect to gain with what they expect to loose after donation.
The idea that individuals obtain a satisfaction or a benefit perception is as-
sociated to the fact that they perceive the action of donating blood, plasma
or an organ/bone marrow, as an action that improves the life of the one who
receives it, or even just for the fact of giving (what we have called in this
paper the per se benefit). For donors, we include several questions about
the perceived effects that a blood or plasma donation has, and for those
who are not donors, we ask them about their attitudes towards donation
primordially, but also we make them put their selves on a donors feet, and
answer questions like if they were donors.
We consider important to know if individuals think that information is
enough about these kinds of donations. Morgan S. (2008) argued that in-
formation can be understand as a variable under the individuals control
because the individual collects only the information that he is interested
in remembering, or because the individual decides where to go in search of
information. So, the individual decides not only how much, but also where
to go in search of information. Frutos M.A (2002) found that the more
information an individual has the more likely of signing a donors card an
individual is.
Attitudes towards donation are also considered relevant for this research.
Individuals can have shame to talk about personal details (like previous
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illness or life habits they have), can have fears or other worries that may
dissuade them of their intentions (for those who have) to become a donor.
Frutos M.A et al (2002) concluded, in the context of deceased organ donors,
that feeling fear reduces the probability of an individual to sign a donors
card.
The reasons for an individual to become donor or not, can be many. What
we do is to propose a list of reasons and make individuals order them. We
do, either for donors or non-donors three different questions, following the
new and original guessing games rule (Bran˜as P., 2008). Individuals have to
answer three different questions about the reasons they have, and about the
reasons that the rest of individuals have either to donate or to not donate.
We consider important these questions because, with them, we are able to
compare what individuals think, with the more important reason that makes
actually each individual decide to donate.
Answering to the questionnaire, in particular, those individuals who state
to be donors are asked to give their opinion about the perceived quality of
the services. It is also important, for every individual, donor or non-donor,
to know if they trust in the health care system, or not, in the context we are
studying (Frutos et al., 2002). The hypothesis we make is that an individual
who trusts in the sanitary system is more likely to be a donor.
Concerning incentives, we found many studies that do mention the common
practice in some countries to compensate individuals for a blood donation.
Lacetera and Macis (2008) proved that when they offered, to individuals,
incentives such as a reward for reaching a certain number of blood donations
(incentives based on social prestige, like a medal) leads onto an increase in
the frequency of donations. Finally, they concluded that, social prestige
awards (incentives like medals, public lists of blood donors and the like)
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attached to being a repeated donor could work as effective incentives to
increase the supply of blood. It is thought that the introduction of these
economic awards creates doubts about the true reason behind pro-social be-
haviour, but it is also true that we need to solve the problem that there is a
lack of donors to cover the needs of this people waiting for a transfusion or a
transplant. Incentives seem to be a possible solution to solve such a problem.
Incentives have also importance not only on the decision but also on the
results, even though, obviously, in different ways. What kinds of incentives
have a positive impact on individuals decision of donating or not? Goette
and Stutzer in a recent study (2008) showed the impact on blood donations,
either in quality or in quantity, of monetary incentives such as a lottery
ticket or a free cholesterol test. They demonstrated that material incentives
have no negative effects. In the questionnaire we ask individuals about these
kinds of incentives, specifically if they think that donating blood or an or-
gan in live must be taken into account when establishing priorities in health
assistance.
Finally, the same study of Lacetera and Macis (2008) detects that there
is essentially no effect of incentives over blood stable donors. This is rele-
vant for this study, because it supports the idea that these people are acting
following the principles of altruistic motivation. And also it is a proof of
what we have pointed before: the heterogeneity of individuals. Thats the
reason why in the questionnaire we make distinction between individuals
that are donors but not stable and stable donors (as a remark, we consider
a donor is stable when he has donate at least 4 times in the last two years,
that is once each six months).
Another aspect considered is that some people donate because of the social
prestige gained with donations. Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) have formalized
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these effects in a model where individuals perform altruistic activities to
increase their social reputation and self-respect.
Destination of blood is also important to consider. Some individuals do
not like that their blood goes to somebody who does not deserve it and
this opens an interesting topic of discussion. Also the knowledge about
compatibility requirements necessaries for the living organ donations or re-
quirements for being blood donor are relevant and attention-grabbing for
this study. Being compatible or not for being an organ donor, or being
selected as a suitable or not suitable for being blood donor, it is not some-
thing that the individuals can control. We ask individuals if they know the
requirements because we think that is important, before making a decision,
to have enough knowledge about. Uncertainty must then be taken into ac-
count, because if individuals state that they consider there is not enough
knowledge, this could be an explanation of the lack of donors nowadays.
Other variables that we consider important are aspects of tradition and
culture. Some studies consider it important and thats why we ask individ-
uals if they know predecessors of donors in their families or if they think
they live in an environment of solidarity. Individuals are heterogeneous and
every region and country differs from the other in terms of different culture
or habits.
For the questionnaire about living organ donations we consider familiar sup-
port as a factor also to be important when making such a decision (Morgan
S. 2008). Their familiar circle is going to have a strong influence over the
individuals decision making. Also at the beginning of this work we have
talk about the different kinds of altruism. The living organ donation is an
example of kin altruism. If an individual knows somebody close in need of a
transplant, this individual is going to be, in principle, proactive to the idea
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of donating (in terms of a positive intention). Epstein (2008) showed with a
model that a strong relationship with the recipient increases an individuals
disposition to face the costs of donation.
In case of living donors the satisfaction is expected to be stronger than
for the blood donors. The reason is that living donations are directed, and
the donor knows who is going to be the recipient (usually among familiars
or relatives for compatibility reasons). Sometimes, even if he doesnt know
him personally, he has some information about him. In blood donations,
the donor gives his blood to a blood bank, so the donor doesnt knows who
is going to be the recipient. The satisfaction then is different in each kind
of donation. If the donation is among relatives, it is, by definition, non-
anonymous, and it is not very well tolerated but highly valued (Hilhorst M.,
2005).
How important are the donation costs perceived by individuals? We ex-
pect that individuals who donate blood/plasma do not consider important
these costs because, comparing them with the benefits or the satisfaction of
a donation, the costs are negligible. However, we expect to find a stronger
negative effect of the costs, for the living organ donations, over individuals
utility.
4.1 Survey
The pilot questionnaire was done in the Public University of Navarre the
second week of May 2009, and we distributed a total of 130 questionnaires
among students of the Faculty of Economics Science and Business Admin-
istration.
We consider important that individuals do the questionnaire alone on their
own, and obviously this is difficult to control. That is why we gave the ques-
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tionnaire to the students at the end of the lesson they were having, and they
were asked to give the questionnaire back the day after. The questionnaire
must be treated as a pilot questionnaire.
The questionnaire is divided into four parts:
• Part I: Personal Data. In this first part of the questionnaire, individ-
uals have to answer questions about their sex, age, level of studies,
place of residence and so on. These are general questions to describe
the population we are analyzing.
• Part II: Questions for those who state to be blood/plasma donors.
Individuals who state to be blood/plasma donors find here some ques-
tions where they can give their opinion about the experience of being
donors. We ask them also about the reasons why they decided to be
donors, and why do they think that people decide to be donor or not.
• Part III: Questions for the non-blood/plasma donors. In this part of
the questionnaire, individuals who state no to be donors, answer ques-
tions about what they know about blood/plasma donations, and what
they would expect (specially in terms of benefits and costs) should
they become donors.
• Part IV: Questions about living organ donations (this is a common
part for blood/plasma donors and non-donors). We propose to indi-
viduals a specific situation in which they have to state how likely are
they to donate an organ in life if somebody closer to them needs it.
We also make individuals questions about their expected effects of a
hypothetical living organ donation, information and the like.
Having separated those who are donors from those who are not, we are able
to detect some differences and similarities between donors and non-donors.
Also we make distinction in the questions proposed for blood/plasma and
organ/bone marrow donations.
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5 Survey Results
We have a total of 97 questionnaires answered (of 130 that were distributed).
This makes a percentage of response of 75%. 1
Table 1: Socio-demographic Description of the sample (Frequencies rep-
resent the number of individuals)
blood donors non blood donors TOTAL
men 3 35 38
women 9 50 59
sample size (N) 12 85 97
ranges of ages [19, 31] [18, 41] [18, 41]
mean age 22.67 21.87 21.97
Table 1 shows the distribution between donors and non-donors. We have
12 individuals stating to be blood/plasma donors and 85 individuals who are
not blood/plasma donors. 9 out of 12 individuals, stating to be blood/plasma
donors, are women. For those who are not blood donors, we find 35 men
and 50 women. All the individuals are students so the range of age is not
very big, standing, for the sample, the mean age in 21.97 years old. Ages
are between 18 the youngest to 41 years old.
1We obtain 25 answered questionnaires for undergraduates of third year of Economics,
19 of the students of 1st year of the Marketing Diploma, 15 of the students of the Inter-
national group (2nd year of Economics), 31 answers of students of third year of Business
and Administration and 7 answers of the PhD students in Economics
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Results for the blood/plasma donors (12 individuals)
The three men who are donors are stable donors. 4 women state also to
be stable donors but 5 state also not to be stable donors (as a remark, we
consider a stable donor an individual that has donate at least once each six
months in the last two years).
For explaining the degree of individual’s self interest and altruism, we ask
individuals about the costs of giving blood that they perceive (this is ques-
tion P11.2a in the questionnaire) and about the benefits and satisfaction
perceived of such a donation (questions P11.2b and P11.2c)
Table 2. Benefits and costs of a Blood Donation (Frequencies represent
the number of individuals)
Fully Agree Agree Disagree Fully Disagree
perceived costs 2 0 1 9
per se benefit 6 5 0 1
other regarding 8 4 0 0
Table 2 shows the results about the perceived benefits and costs of a blood
or plasma donation from the point of view of the donors. 10 individuals out
of 12 do not agree on that a blood/plasma donation implies costs (neither
material nor intangible). 11 individuals agree on that there is a benefit per
se of giving blood/plasma, and all the respondents agree on that there is a
benefit associated to the fact that some other receive this blood and improve
his health with it.
The reasons why individuals are donors can be many, and not all of them
are easy to identify. We propose these individuals (donors) a list of reasons
which they have to value them in order of importance (see P8in the ques-
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tionnaire).
Table 3: Donors Motives for donation (Frequencies represent the number
of individuals)
1st Option 2nd Option
Info. donors’ campaign 0 3
Know somebody in need of a transfusion 0 2
Familiar tradition 0 3
Without apparent reason 1 3
Conscious of necessity 11 0
Table 3 shows the reasons that motivate donors for donating blood/plasma.
We have 11 donors out of 12, who think that being conscious of the donors
necessity to cover the actual demand of blood is the most important reason
for deciding to become donor (there is one missing value due to an individual
that has not choose a second option)
For the rest of statements frequencies distribute evenly. Data show that
donating as a result of familiar tradition or because having receive informa-
tion in a donation’s campaign are chosen as a second option by a quarter
of the donors (that is 3 individuals). Only 2 individuals choose knowing
somebody in need of a transfusion it as the second option.
Donors must answer two questions about which they think is the most im-
portant reason why individuals donate (question P12 in the questionnaire),
and which is the most important motive for not donating for those individ-
uals who do not donate blood/plasma (question P13).
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Table 4: Reasons for donating for any individual according to donors (Fre-
quencies represent the number of individuals)
1st Option 2nd Option
Info. donor’s campaign 0 3
Know somebody in need of a transfusion 3 3
Familiar Tradition 3 3
Without apparent reason 0 2
Consciouss of necessity 6 1
Table 4 shows the results of the reasons for donating for any individual
according to donors. There is a 50% of the donors think that the most com-
mon reason why individuals decide to be donors is because of consciousness
of necessity to cover the demand of blood. Familiar tradition and knowing
somebody in need of a transfusion are the second more frequent answers
as first option (3 individuals choose this reason as first option and 3 more
as second option) for these individuals (and they are equally distributed).
Second options distributed evenly.
Table 5: Reasons for not donating for any individual according to donors
(Frequencies represents the number of individuals)
1st Option 2nd Option
Fear 5 3
Have not Thought 3 2
No trust H.C.S 0 1
Lack of Information 0 2
Do not want 2 0
Can not for health or other reasons 2 4
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Table 5 shows the result for the motives for not donating for any individual
as seen by donors. From the point of view of the donors, the most frequent
reason that they have not thought about it. As a second option individuals
think that the main reason is because they can not for health or other rea-
sons.
Results for the Non-Donors (85 individuals)
Following the same schedule we have done for the donors,firstly, we ask
individuals about the reasons why they are not donors (question P17 in the
questionnaire, and , secondly about the benefits and costs that they would
expect to perceive about being blood/plasma donors (questions P18.2a and
P18.2c), finally we ask them what do they think that are the most impor-
tant reasons, for any individual, for being a donor (question P19), and the
most common reasons why any individual is not a donor (question P20).
Table 6: Reasons for not donating (Frequencies represent the number of
individuals)
1st Option 2nd Option
Fear 25 12
Have not thought 24 13
No trust H.C.S 0 8
Lack of Information 20 23
Do not want 2 8
Can not (health) 10 2
Total 81 66
Table 6 shows the reasons that the non donors state to have for not donat-
ing. There are 25 individuals who think that fear is the most important
reason why they are not donors. 24 state the fact that they have not though
30
about it, and 20 individuals think that there is a lack of information about
blood donations (this is also a statement that is very frequent as a second
choice, having 23 votes).
Table 7: Benefits and costs of a Blood Donation according to non donors
(Frequencies represent the number of individuals)
Fully Agree Agree Disagree Fully Disagree No response
soc. benefit 40 36 3 1 5
more positive 39 37 4 1 4
Table 7 shows the perceived benefits and costs of a blood donation accord-
ing to the non-donors. There are 76 individuals out of 80 non-donors who
answered to this question (that makes a 95%) who agree on that there is a
social benefit of donating blood. Also half of the non-donors agree on that
donating blood has more positive than negative aspects.
Table 8: Reasons for donating for any individual according to non-donors
(Frequencies represent the number of individuals)
1st Option 2nd Option
Info. donor’s campaign 3 12
Know somebody in need of a transfusion 22 29
Familiar Tradition 5 12
Without apparent reason 1 16
Consciouss of necessity 54 13
Total 85 82
Table 8 shows the reasons for donation by donors as seen by non-donors.
The idea of the consciousness of necessity seems important for these indi-
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viduals as a reason, for donating, for those individuals who are donors. 54
individuals choose this statement as the first or the most important. The
second one most frequent is to know somebody in need of a transfusion,
that is chosen by 22 individuals as the most important. For the rest of
statements, knowing somebody is chosen as second option with 29 votes of
individuals.
Table 9: Reasons for any individual for not donating according to donors
(Frequencies represent the number of individuals)
1st Option 2nd Option
Fear 27 20
Have not Thought 29 20
No trust H.C.S 1 6
Lack of Information 10 17
Do not want 12 11
Can not (health) 4 5
Total 83 79
27 individuals choose fear and have not thought about the idea of donating
as the more frequent and important option, for any individual, for not to
donate. 29 individuals think that the most important reason may be be-
cause they have not though about it. Both statements are also frequents as
second choices, with 20 votes each.
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Results for living organ donations
First question about living organ donations is to know if, in a hypothet-
ical situation, individuals would or would not be willing to donate an organ
in life
Table 10: Disposition to donate an organ in life (Frequencies represent
the number of individuals)
blood donors Non Blood donors Total
No - - -
Very Unlikely - - -
Unlikely - 3 3
Likely 3 18 21
Very Likely 3 22 25
Yes 6 39 45
Total 12 82 94
Table 10 shows the willingness of individuals to donate an organ in life. 6
out of 12 of the blood donors state that they would give an organ certainly
(in the hypothetical case that they are invited to do so) and the other 50%
think that it is probable, or very probable to donate his organ in life if some-
body closer needs it.
Those individuals who state having doubts (43 non donors and 6 donors)
about such a willingness towards donation are asked about their agreement
or disagreement with three statements that are proposed as costs that can
dissuade individuals from donating. This statements are in the question
P22 in the questionnaire.
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Table 11 a: Reasons for not donating an organ in life according to donors
(Frequencies represent the number of individuals in agreement)
Fully Agree Agree Disagree Fully Disagree
neg. effects 1 4 1 0
deceased donor 1 2 1 1
incomplete information 2 2 1 0
Table 11 b: Reasons for not donating an organ in life according to non-
donors (Frequencies represent the number of individuals in agreement)
Fully Agree Agree Disagree Fully Disagree
neg. effects 11 25 5 2
deceased donor 7 20 7 5
incomplete information 6 18 12 2
Tables 11 a and 11 b show the reasons for not donating an organ in life
for those individuals who have doubts about donating. There are 5 out of 6
individuals among blood donors that agree to be worried about the negative
effects that could happen on their health in the long term. There are also
36 out of the 43 non-donors who answered to this question that agree on
these worries too. 3 donors and 27 non-donors think that the possibility
of having organs from deceased donors could be a reason for deciding not
to donate their organs in life. 24 non donors agree on that they would not
donate because of the incomplete information about donors health related
quality of life after donation.
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In the particular case of organ donors, we ask individuals about their per-
ceived benefits and costs that a living organ donation could have (statements
P23.4a to 23.4c in the questionnaire).
Table 12 a: Perceived effects of an organ in life according to donors (Fre-
quencies represent the number of individuals in agreement)
Fully Agree Agree Disagree Fully Disagree
per se benefit 4 7 1 0
social contribution 4 5 3 0
satisf. > costs 3 6 2 1
Table 12 b: Perceived effects of an organ donation in life according to
non-donors (Frequencies represent the number of individuals in agreement)
Fully Agree Agree Disagree Fully Disagree
per se benefit 39 38 4 1
social contribution 34 37 9 3
satisf. > costs 26 38 10 1
Tables 12 a and 12 b show the results about the perceived benefits and
costs of donating an organ in life for donors and for non-donors. 39 non-
donors are in full agreement on that there is a per se benefit associated to
the only fact of giving an organ in life. 38 more (non-donors) are also in
agreement. Donors show also to be in agreement, 4 of them fully and 7 in
agreement.
In general there is agreement on that donating an organ in life is a so-
cial contribution, where everybody benefits (and not only the recipient). 34
non donors are in full agreement and 37 in agreement. In total, 9 donors
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are in agreement (out of 12 donors this is a 75% of the donors who are in
agreement) on that there is a perception of social contribution of giving an
organ in life.
To end up, comparing benefits with costs of a possible organ donation, such
as the one we propose, there are 26 non-donors that are in full agreement
on that satisfaction of giving an organ in life may be higher than its costs.
38 more non-donors are also in agreement with this statement. However,
there are 10 individuals (non-donors) that show disagreement with this feel-
ing. 9 donors agree on this perception of higher benefits than costs of organ
donations.
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6 Discussion
Our interest is to identify which are the variables having influence over the
individuals decision of becoming a donor. We know that a donation do
not depends only on the individuals decision, but also on exogenous factors
that determine for a donation to be done or not. An individual, when he
decides to be a donor, is not sure at all that the donation is going to be
done. Even though, in this work we are in the first phase of a donation
procedure. The second phase will be working to identify how to increase
the number of blood, organ or bone-marrow donations, but we leave this for
future research, focusing this work on the decision and attitudes or moti-
vations towards these kinds of donations, instead of in the final result (if a
donation is realised or not).
Our model states that individuals decide to be donors if and only if the
expected satisfaction of donation exceeds the expected costs. So, when we
analyze data of individuals who state to be blood donors, we must take into
account these expectations. We do not know which are the benefits and
costs that these individuals perceive of donations.
It is important to stress the distinction between attitudes towards blood
or organs donation and making a real donation. A positive attitude towards
donation does not give certainty of an increase in the number of donors.
However, if people realise or became conscious of the lack of donors nowa-
days, we will gain in possibilities of increasing the number of donors. Making
efforts in creating the appropriate incentive policy is then important, taking
into account that if the incentive is not well designed, we risk of dissuading
actual donors.
The questionnaire is a pilot questionnaire and it has been done only for
university students. We survey it to students because we consider that it is
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important to see if the questions are easy to understand. Then, we can think
about doing it for the general population to test our preliminary results.
In this work, we focus results on the variables that emerge from the model
of behaviour we proposed. However there are some variables that are in-
teresting, and that are included in the questionnaire, such as the idea of a
monetary compensation, many questions about information and individu-
als worries about blood destination. These variables will be treated later on.
Concerning blood donations, we find general disagreement among donors
with the idea of a monetary compensation for those individuals who state
to be blood or plasma donors. However, non donors are divided fifty-fifty
concerning this possibility of paying for blood donations.
We also find that information, no matter which kind of donation, seems
to be not enough or incomplete for all the respondents.
Blood donors would not like their blood to go out of the region where they
have donated. However, those who are not blood/plasma donors do not
mind if their blood goes to another region or even another country.
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7 Conclusions
1. In this research we study attitudes towards blood and organ donations.
2. We propose an economic model of behaviour that works under the
assumption that individuals who decide to be blood or organ donors
expect to be better of after donation. Each individual gives a different
importance to these expected gains and looses attached to donations.
The problem that an individual solves before deciding if being donor
or not is comparing the expected utility of deciding to be a donor with
the alternative decision (behave selfishly).
E[U bedonori (.); p ∈ [0, 1]] ≥ U selfinteresti (7)
If the expected utility of being donor exceeds the utility obtained be-
having selfishly, then the individual decides to be donor. The impor-
tance of the perceived costs of a donation is measured by the parameter
δi. The negative effect for an individual is measured as the difference
in the benefits he has before donation and the expected benefits after
the blood donation. The difference between the expected gains and
looses is deciding for individuals. The decision depends on the val-
ues of δi . For individuals having expectations of high losses and low
gains, the probability of becoming donor is low, because it would be
necessary a value of δi low enough for the total gains of donation to
be higher than its costs.
3. A pilot questionnaire helps us to see which variables that emerge from
the model are deciding on individuals decisions. All respondents of
this survey were students of the Public University of Navarre.
4. The results we obtain of these variables are that the fact of being
conscious of the donor’s necessity for covering the demand of blood
is the most important reason for donating blood. Also donors think
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that, in general, the most common reasons for donation are, precisely,
this feeling of consciousness, but also knowing somebody who needs a
transfusion or familiar tradition. According to donors, people do not
donate because have not think about the possibility or because of fear.
In fact, non donors state that fear and have not thought about it are
the most important reasons for not donating, and they also think that
it is the most common answer in the society, in addition to problems
of health that leave some individuals (maybe with intention of being
donors) out of the possibility of being donors.
5. How can we merge this results with the model of behaviour proposed?
As we found that the most importante reason for donating is con-
sciousness of the donors necessity and half of the individuals who an-
swered the questionnaire would be disposed to give an organ in life
with certainty, it seems to exist a degree of altruism among individuals
(δi < 1). Also, individuals perceive a benefit because somebody im-
proves his well-being due to a blood/organ donation (vi(U−i(g)) > 0)
or for the only fact of giving (vi(g) > 0). Costs seem to be negligible
for individuals when they have to value blood donations. However,
there is a perception of high costs for individuals when they are asked
to value living organ donations (∂pii(Hi)∂g ≤ 0).
6. New ideas have emerged for future research. The model we propose is
very general, and maybe the questionnaire helps us to give a formal
expression for the functions pii(Xi) and vi(U−i(g)) finding variables
that actually explain what individuals consider as looses and satisfac-
tion when donating. We need a sample representative of the donors
society.
• Concerning to the model, including a new parameter in the model
is being considered. The idea is that there must be a parameter
that measures the probability of being the unique possible donor
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for a recipient. When the probability of being the unique donor
approaches to 1, the expected losses are lesser, and the expected
gains (satisfaction) are higher. Further research will try to in-
troduce this aspect in the expected utility function, as a way of
reinforcing the model with this remark.
• Concerning to the questionnaire, next phase consists in a exhaus-
tive revision, with the purpose of having a sample size enough for
being representative. This includes not only new redaction of the
questions but also including new questions and removing some
others that have been detected as not useful for the purpose of
the questionnaire, that is identifying attitudes towards blood and
organ donations and the principal motives of the lack of donors.
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